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Abstract
We characterize the proﬁt-maximizing mechanism for repeatedly selling a non-durable good
in continuous time. The valuation of each agent is private information and changes over time.
At the time of contracting every agent privately observes his initial type which inﬂuences
the evolution of his valuation process. In the proﬁt-maximizing mechanism the allocation is
distorted in favor of agents with high initial types.
We derive the optimal mechanism in closed form, which enables us to compare the distortion in various examples. The case where the valuation of the agents follows an arithmetic/geometric Brownian motion, Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, or is derived from a Bayesian
learning model are discussed. We show that depending on the nature of the private information
and the valuation process the distortion might increase or decrease over time.
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1

Introduction

1.1

Motivation

We analyze the nature of the optimal, revenue-maximizing, contract, in a dynamic environment with
private information at the time of contracting and in all future periods. In contrast to almost all of
the received literature, we consider a setting in continuous, rather than discrete, time. Within the
continuous time setting, we are mostly concerned with environments where the uncertainty, and in
particular the private information of the agent can be described by a Brownian motion. Throughout,
we restrict our attention to allocation problems that are time separable, i.e. allocation problems
where the current allocation choice does not restrict future allocation choices. This restriction is
suﬃciently mild to include most, if not all of the allocation problems explicitly analyzed in the
literature so far, for the example the optimal quantity provision by the monopolist as in Battaglini
(2005) or the separable environments in Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014). But the focus on time
separable allocation problems is restrictive in that it excludes problems such as the optimal timing
of a sale of a durable good, where the present decision, say a sale, naturally preempts certain future
decision, say a sale, again.
We shall show that the continuous time setting with Brownian motions presents us with at
least three advantages over the discrete time setting. The ﬁrst advantage of the continuous time
and Brownian motion setting is that it allows to restrict attention to a small class of deviations,
deviations that we call consistent. The consistent deviations, by themselves only necessary conditions, nonetheless allow us to completely describe the indirect utility of the agent in any incentive
compatible mechanism. More precisely, at time zero the initial shock of the agent is drawn and
the initial shock determines the probability measure of the entire future valuation process. An
important innovation of the paper is that it does not rely on any backward induction arguments. In
fact, backward induction is replaced with a direct calculation of expected payoﬀs of deviations. If
the agent deviates he changes the probability measure of the reported valuation process. To avoid
working with the change in measures directly we restrict attention to consistent deviations. We
call the deviation consistent if, after his initial misreport, say b instead of a, the agent reports his
valuation as if it would follow the same Brownian motion as the one which drives his true valuation.
As there is a true initial shock, namely b, which could have made these subsequent reports, the
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principal can not detect such a deviation and is forced to assign the allocation and transfer process
of the imitated shock b. In particular, this allows us to evaluate the payoﬀs of the truthful and the
consistently deviating agent with respect to the same expectation operator. Now, as we assume the
initial shock to be one dimensional and given that all deviations are parametrized over the time
zero shock, standard mechanism design arguments deliver the smoothness of the value function of
the agent.
The large class of time separable allocation policies then allows us to rewrite the suﬃciency
conditions exclusively in terms of the ﬂow virtual utilities, which by our assumption on the valuation
process only depends on the current valuation and the initial shock of the agent. By using the class
of consistent deviations and allowing for time separable allocation policies, we can completely avoid
the veriﬁcation of the incentive compatibility conditions via backward induction methods which
was the basic instrument to establish the suﬃcient conditions used in all of the preceding literature
with dynamic adverse selection.
The second advantage of the continuous time approach is that we can explicitly derive the
optimal dynamic allocation process and the associated transfers. We can therefore describe the
nature of the optimal policy in much greater detail than it has been possible in discrete time
environments. We consider in some detail a number of well-known stochastic processes, in particular
the arithmetic and the geometric Brownian motion. The natural starting point here is to consider the
case in which the private information of the agent is the current state of the process, in particular the
initial state of the Brownian motion is private information, but where the drift and volatility of the
process are publicly known. In the models with discrete time, to be discussed below, this corresponds
to the case where the private information represents the current state of the Markov process, but
where the Markov transition matrix itself is publicly known. But our technique also allows us to
consider the case when either the drift or the variance of the Brownian motion constitutes the initial
private information. Subsequently, the state of the process will also be private information, but at
the beginning, the starting point of the process is assumed to be commonly known to remain within
a one-dimensional model of private information at each point in time. In particular, we can allow
the variance rather than the mean of the stochastic process to form the private information, and
yet display transparent suﬃcient conditions for optimality. In much of the earlier literature, the
types had to be assumed to be ordered according to ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance in order to
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give rise to suﬃcient conditions for optimality. We should also emphasize that with the exception
of a recent paper by Boleslavksy and Said (2013), the earlier contributions with an inﬁnite horizon
did not allow for the possibility that the very structure of the stochastic process may constitute the
private information.
The third advantage of the continuous time Brownian motion approach is that we can relate our
model of dynamic adverse selection to a number of continuous time models with dynamic moral
hazard. For example, in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), (2008), the state of the process describes
the current cash ﬂow of the project and the moral hazard problem is that the entrepreneur, the
agent, shares the unobservable cash ﬂow with the investor, the principal. In turn, we can restate the
moral hazard problem as an adverse selection problem, where the principal has to induce the agent
to tell the truth about the state of the process, and can achieve truthtelling through appropriate
transfer payments, i.e. sharing rules of the cash ﬂow. In contrast to the literature, which assumes
that there is no private information prior to the contract, we can solve for the optimal contract in
the presence of private information before and after the contract is signed.
In the ﬁrst part of the paper, we restrict attention to the case where the current valuation of the
agent is a function of the initial state, the current state, and time only, and importantly does not
depend on the entire realized path of the Brownian motion. With this restriction, the ﬂow virtual
utility depends only on the initial shock and the valuation. In the second part of the paper, we
generalize the analysis and allow the valuation of the agent to be a function of the entire realized
path of the process, yet retain the property that the virtual utility itself depends only on the initial
shock and the valuation. This will allow us to include in our analysis the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process and the Bayesian learning process about an unknown and normally distributed drift of a
Brownian motion.

1.2

Related Literature

The analysis of the revenue maximizing contract in an environment where the private information
may change over time appears ﬁrst in a seminal paper of Baron and Besanko (1984). They considered a two period model of a regulator facing a monopolist with unknown, but in every period,
constant marginal cost. Besanko (1985) oﬀers an extension to a ﬁnite horizon environment with a
general cost function, where the unknown parameter is either distributed independently and iden-
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tically over time, or follows a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process. Since these early contributions, the
literature has developed rapidly. Courty and Li (2000) consider the revenue maximizing contract in
a sequential screening problem, where the preferences of the buyer may change over time. They only
considered a terminal allocation problem in the second period, where Baron and Besanko (1984)
considered a sequence of allocation problems, but their model extends the analysis to environments
where the private information, the state of the world, is ordered according to either ﬁrst or second order stochastic dominance. Battaglini (2005) considered a quantity discriminating monopolist
who provides a menu of choices to a consumer whose valuation can change over time according to a
commonly known Markov process. In contrast to the earlier work, he explicitly considers an inﬁnite
time horizon and showed that the distortion due to the initial private information vanishes over
time. Eső and Szentes (2007) rephrased the two period sequential screening problem by showing
that the additional signal arriving in period two can always be represented by a diﬀerent signal with
the property that the signal in period one and two are orthogonal to each other. The orthogonal
representation of the signals allows them to think of the period two information as incremental
relative to period one. And in particular, it allows them to establish the level of the information
rent that arises solely from the initial private information, the period one information. Eso and
Szentes (2014) show in a general dynamic environment that the agent receives information rent only
for his initial information.
Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014) consider a general environment in an inﬁnite horizon setting
and allowing for general allocation problems, encompassing the earlier literature (with continuous
type spaces). They obtain general necessary conditions for incentive compatibility and present a
variety of suﬃcient conditions for revenue maximizing contracts for speciﬁc classes of environments.
A feature common to almost of these contributions is that the private information of the agent
is represented by the current state of a Markov process, and that the new information that the
agent receives is controlled by the current state, and in turn, leads to a new state of the Markov
process. By contrast, Boleslavksy and Said (2013) let the initial private information of the agent
be the nature of the Markov process itself, for example the parameter describing the persistence
of the state, and then take the initial state of the process as commonly known. Interestingly, this
dramatically changes the impact that the initial private information has on the future allocations.
In particular, the distortions in the future allocation may now rise over time rather than decline
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as in the earlier literature. Finally, Kakade, Lobel, and Nazerzadeh (2013) consider a class of
dynamic allocation problems, a suitable generalization of the single unit allocation problem and
impose a separability condition (additive or multiplicative) on the interaction of the initial private
information and all subsequent signals. The separability condition allows them to obtain an explicit
characterization of the revenue maximizing contract and derive transparent suﬃcient conditions for
the optimal contract.

2

Dynamic Sales: An Example

One of the simplest economic situations that gives rise to a dynamic mechanism design problem
is a repeated sales problem where the buyer is unsure about his future valuation for the good.
Examples of such situations are gym membership and phone contracts. At any given point in time
the buyer knows how much he values making a call or going to the gym, but he might only have
a probabilistic assessment on how much he values the service tomorrow or a year in the future.
Usually, it is harder for the buyer to asses how much he values the good at times that are further in
the future. Mathematically this uncertainty about future valuations can be captured by modelling
the buyers valuation as a stochastic process.
From the monopolistic sellers point of view the question arises whether the uncertainty of the
buyer can be used to increase proﬁts by using a dynamic contract. In reality a variety of dynamic
contracts is used (for example for gym memberships and mobile phone contracts):
1. Flatrates where the buyer only pays a ﬁxed fee regardless of his consumption.
2. Two part tariﬀs where the buyer selects from a menu a ﬁxed fee and a price of consumption.
He pays the ﬁxed fee independent of his level of consumption. In addition the buyer has to
pay for his consumption. Tariﬀs with higher ﬁxed fees feature lower prices of consumption.
3. Two part tariﬀs where the buyer selects from a menu a ﬁxed fee and an amount of free
consumption. He pays the ﬁxed fee independent of his consumption. In addition the buyer
has to pay for his consumption if it exceeds a threshold. Tariﬀs with higher ﬁxed fees feature
higher amounts of free consumption.
While those dynamic contracts can be observed in a wide range of situations their theoretical
properties are unclear. Using a dynamic mechanism design perspective we can explain why and
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under what circumstances those dynamic contracts are used.
Assume the valuation (vt )t∈R+ of the buyer is a geometric Brownian motion which is shifted
upwards by v ≥ 0, i.e.
dvt = (vt − v)dWt ,

(1)

where (Wt )t∈R+ is a Brownian motion. The initial valuation of the buyer v0 ∈ (v, ∞), is distributed
according to the absolutely continuous distribution function F : (v, ∞) → [0, 1] with density f = F  .
We assume that F is such that v →

1−F (v)
f (v) v

is non-increasing. The choice of the shifted geometric

Brownian motion as a valuation process ensures that the valuation vt for the good will be greater
than v at every point in time t. Furthermore, the valuation at time t is the agent’s best estimate
of his valuation at later times s > t, i.e.
vt = E[vs | vt ] .
At every point in time t the buyer chooses an amount of consumption xt ∈ X ⊆ R+ and pays pt
such that his overall utility equals

E



∞
0

e

−rt

(vt · xt − pt )dt .

In the following section we describe the revenue maximizing dynamic contract oﬀered by a monopolistic seller. In general, dynamic contracts could have complicated features as the payments at time
t could depend on all the past consumption decisions and messages sent by the agent. However, as
we will show in the next section oﬀering a menu of simple static contracts is suﬃcient to maximize
the expected intertemporal revenue.
To evaluate dynamic contracts from the sellers perspective, we assume that the seller faces
continuous, non-decreasing production cost c : X → R+ , such that his overall payoﬀ equals
 ∞

−rt
E
e (pt − c(xt ))dt .
0

The results derived later in this paper will prove that (under some regularity conditions on F ) an
optimal contract (indirect mechanism) for the seller is of the following form: At time zero the seller
oﬀers a menu of static contracts each consisting of a time independent ﬁxed membership fee m ≥ 0,
and a consumption dependent payment:
q(m, xt ) = A(m)c(xt ) − [A(m) − 1] vxt .

ValuationConsumption on a logscale

8

100
70
50
30
20
15
10

0

20

40

60

80

100

Time

Figure 1: The initial valuation v0 is exponentially distributed with mean 50 and the valuation
evolves as a geometric Brownian motion without drift. The solid lines are two paths of the valuation
starting at an initial valuation of 60 (red) and 80 (blue) which coincide after time t = 45. The
dashed lines are the consumption levels in the revenue maximizing contract if the cost of production
is quadratic c(x) = x2 /2. As the optimal consumption is linear in the valuation they are parallel
on a logarithmic scale. Note, that even after the valuations coincide the consumption levels of the
agents with diﬀerent initial valuations diﬀer and the optimal consumption level react with diﬀering
intensity to changes in the valuations. The consumption of the agent in the welfare maximizing
contract would exactly equal his valuation.
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The consumption dependent payment q consists of a price of consumption of A(m) ≥ 1 and
a linear consumption discount (A(m) − 1)vxt . If the buyer accepts a contract he has to pay the
membership fee m ≥ 0 independent of his consumption. At the same time he has to pay q(m, xt )
depending on his consumption xt in period t such that his overall payment at time t equals
pt = m + q(m, xt ) = m + A(m)c(xt ) − [(A(m) − 1] vxt .

(2)

The optimal ﬁxed fee m(v0 ) chosen by the agent depends on the agent’s initial valuation v0 will be
such that A(m(v0 )) =

2.1

v0
,
J(v0 )

where J(v) = v −

1−F (v)
f (v)

is the virtual valuation.

Flat Rate Contracts

In a ﬂat rate contract the payment pt is constant over time and independent of the buyers consumption. As the buyers utility increases in the consumption level he will always consume the good at
the maximum possible intensity.
Assume the production cost c is constant and equal to zero, the set of possible allocations is
given by X = [0, 1], and the minimal valuation v equals zero. A direct consequence of the transfers
described in (2) is the following result characterizing an optimal mechanism with zero (marginal)
cost of production: The optimal mechanism is a ﬂat rate where every agent who accepts the contract
at time zero, makes a constant ﬂow payment, independent of his consumption, and consumes the
maximal possible amount: xt = 1.
While the buyer enjoys a utility of vt from consuming the good he dislikes the payments p and
he will suﬀer from a negative ﬂow utility vt − p if vt < p. If his current valuation vt is below the
ﬂat rate price p, not only is his current ﬂow of utility negative, but also his expected continuation
utility of the contract:





∞

E

e

−rs

(vs − ps )dt | vt =

t

vt − p
.
r

(3)

However, as the agent is (legally) bound to the contract he is forced to make the payments. Hence
a ﬂat rate contract makes use of the fact that the agent can commit himself to future payments
and consumption before he learns his valuation.
As a consequence of condition (3) only the agents with an initial valuation v0 ≥ p accept the
contract. All agents with an initial valuation v0 < p reject the contract and never consume the
good no matter how high the consumption utility is at times t > 0.
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2.2

Two-Part Tariﬀs

Having seen that zero marginal cost lead to ﬂat rate tariﬀs, the next section describes the optimal
contract for convex costs. Assume that the minimal valuation v equals zero and the cost function c
is convex. By condition (2) a two-part tariﬀ where the agent pays m independent of his consumption
and A(m)c(x) depending on his is a revenue maximizing contract for the principal. It is worth noting
that a simple menu of static two part tariﬀs can hence maximize the revenue of the principal.
Example 1. Let c(x) = x2 /2 and the initial valuation be exponentially distributed with mean μ, i.e.
F (v0 ) = 1 − exp( vμ0 ) and v = 0. The optimal contract sets for every ﬁxed fee m ∈ (0, ∞) a price of
consumption xt equal to:


−1
x2t
−mr2(r − σ)
1 − exp
.
A (m) =
2
μ

Revenue Maximizing Menu of Contracts

Contract Choosen by the Buyer

Am
3.0

mv0 ,Amv0 
3.0
2.5

2.5

2.0
2.0

1.5
1.0

1.5
0.5

1.0
0.2

Figure 2:

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

m

10

20

30

40

50

60

v0

Illustration of Example 1: v = 0, c(x) = x2 /2, v0 exponentially distributed with mean

μ = 1 and a constant discount factor of r = 1: On the left the optimal menu of contracts. On the
right the contract (m(v0 ), A(m(v0 ))) chosen by the consumer depending on his initial valuation v0 .
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Figure 2.2 illustrates that the consumption how the consumption at time t depends on the time
zero valuation in the context of Example 1.

2.3

Free Minute Contract

Throughout this section we assume that the minimal valuation v is strictly positive and that the
density at the minimal valuation is large enough f (v) > 1/v. In addition we assume that the
marginal cost of providing the good vanish for small quantities, i.e. c (0) = 0. When the agent
decides how much to consume at time t he solves the maximization problem
max {xvt − (z + A(m)c(x) − (A(m) − 1)vx)} .
x

This leads to the ﬁrst order condition
0 = vt − A(m)c (x) + (A(m) − 1)v ⇒ c (x) = v +

(vt − v)
.
A(m)

As the marginal cost of providing the good vanish if the quantity goes to zero it follows that the
consumption of the agent is bounded from below at every point in time by c−1 (v). Hence we can
interpret the amount c−1 (v) as a quantity provided to the agent for free. This is a feature which
could be observed for example in mobile phone contracts. In such a contract the agent can consume
a certain number of minutes for free and only has to pay for the consumption exceeding this amount.
Interestingly, the allocation of the agent with the lowest possible valuation vt = v is not distorted,
while the allocation of agents with higher valuations is distorted downwards compared to the socially
eﬃcient allocation. This is surprising as in static mechanisms, it is usually only the agent with
highest possible valuation that receives an undistorted allocation. In this model the agent with the
highest time zero valuation receives an undistorted allocation. This example illustrates that this
no-distortion at the top result only applies to the valuation at the time of contracting, but not to
later valuations.
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3

The General Model

There are n agents indexed by i ∈ {1, . . . , n} = N . Time is continuous and indexed by t ∈ [0, T ],
where the time horizon T can be ﬁnite or inﬁnite, and if the time horizon is inﬁnite, then we assume
a discount factor r ∈ R+ which is strictly positive, r > 0.
The ﬂow preferences of agent i are represented by a quasilinear utility function:
vti · ui (t, xit ) − pit .

(4)

The function u : R+ × R+ → [0, u] is continuous and strictly increasing in x, decreasing in t and
satisﬁes u(t, 0) = 0 for all t ∈ R+ . We refer to u(t, xit ) as the valuation of xit ∈ [0, x] ⊂ R+ with
0 ≤ x < ∞. The allocation xit can be interpreted as either the quantity or quality of a good that
is allocated to agent i at time t. The type of agent i in period t is given by vti ∈ R+ and the ﬂow
utility in period t is given by the product of the type and the valuation. The payment in period t
is denoted by pit ∈ R.
The type vti of agent i at time t depends on his initial shock θi at time t = 0 and the contemporaneous shock Wti at time t:
vti  φi (t, θi , Wti ) .

(5)

Note, that the initial private information θ need not to be the initial valuation, but might be any
other characteristic determining the probability measure over paths of the valuation (vt )t∈R+ . In
case of the Brownian this might be the initial value, the drift, or the variance, in case of a mean
reverting process this might be the mean reversion speed or the long run-average. At time zero
each agent privately learns his initial shock θi ∈ (θ, θ̄) = Θ ⊆ R, which is drawn from a common
prior distribution F i : R → [0, 1], independently across agents.
The distribution F i has a strictly positive density f i > 0 with decreasing inverse hazard rate
(1 − F i ) /f i . The contemporaneous shock is given by a random process (Wti )t∈R+ of agent i that
changes over time as a consequence of a sequence of incremental shocks and Wti is assumed to be
independent of Wtj for every j = i. The function φi : R+ × Θ × R → R aggregates the initial shock
θi and the contemporaneous Wti of agent i into his type vti . In Section 2 and, later in Section 7,
the valuation function ui (t, xit ) is simply a linear function ui (t, xit ) = xit and the type vti can then
be directly interpreted as the marginal willingness to pay of agent i. We shall sometimes use this
interpretation even without a linear valuation function ui (t, xit ).
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The function φ is twice diﬀerentiable in every direction and in the following we use a small
annotation for partial derivatives, i.e.
φθ (t, θ, w) 

∂φ(t, θ, w)
.
∂θ

If θ is the initial value of the process v0 the derivative φθ is know in the mathematical literature on
stochastic processes as the stochastic ﬂow or generalized stochastic ﬂow if θ determines the evolution
of a diﬀusion by inﬂuencing the drift or variance term (see for example Kunita 1997). The stochastic
ﬂow process (φθ (t, θ, Wti ))t∈R+ is the analogue of the impulse response functions described in the
discrete time dynamic mechanism design literature (see Pavan, Segal, and Toikka 2014, Deﬁnition
3). As we will see in the examples presented later the stochastic ﬂow is of a very simple form for
many classical continuous time diﬀusion processes, like the Brownian motion etc.
We assume that for every agent i a higher initial shock θi leads to a higher type, i.e. φiθ (t, θ, w) ≥
0 and an agent i who observed a higher value of the process Wti has a higher type, i.e. φiw (t, θ, w) > 0
for every (t, θ, w) ∈ R+ × Θ × R.
Assumption 1 (Decreasing Inﬂuence of Initial Shock).
The relative impact of the initial shock on the type:
φθ (t, θ, w)
φ(t, θ, w)

(6)

is non-increasing in w for every (t, θ, w) ∈ R+ × Θ × R.
Assumption 2 (Decreasing Inﬂuence of Initial vs Contemporaneous Shock).
The ratio of the marginal impact of initial and contemporaneous shocks:
φθ (t, θ, w)
φw (t, θ, w)

(7)

is non-increasing in θ for every (t, θ, w) ∈ R+ × Θ × R.
The last assumption implies that the type with a large initial shock is inﬂuenced less by the
contemporaneous shocks that arrive after time zero.
Assumption 3 (Finite Expected Impact of the Initial Shock).
The expected inﬂuence of the initial shock on the type grows at most exponentially, i.e. there exists
two constants C ∈ R+ , q ∈ (0, r) such that E [φθ (t, θi , Wti )] ≤ Ceqt for all t ∈ R+ and θ ∈ Θ.
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At every point in time t the principal chooses an allocation xt ∈ X from a compact, convex set
X ⊂ Rn+ , where xit can be interpreted as the quantity or quality of a good that is allocated to agent
i at time t. We assume that it is always possible to allocate zero to an agent, i.e.
x ∈ X ⇒ (x1 , . . . , xi−1 , 0, xi+1 , . . . , xn ) ∈ X .
To ensure that the problem is well posed we assume that for every feasible allocation process
xi = (xit ) gives ﬁnite expected utility to agent i, i.e.

 T
−rt
i
i
i
E
e 1{vti ≥0} vt u(t, xt )dt | θ < ∞,
0

for every θi in the support of F . The principal receives the sum of discounted ﬂow payments

i
1
i∈N pt minus the production costs c(xt ):

E

T

0

e−rt

pit − c (xt ) dt .

(8)

i∈N

The cost
c : X → R+
is continuous and increasing in every component with c (0) = 0.
Deﬁnition 1 (Value Function).
The indirect utility, or value function, V i (θi ) of agent i given his initial shock θi , his consumption
process (xit )t∈R+ and his payment process (pit )t∈R+ is

V (θ ) = E
i

T

i

0

e

−rt

u

i

(t, xit )vti

−

pit




dt | θ

i

.

(9)

A contract speciﬁes an allocation process (xt )t∈R+ and a payment process (pt )t∈R+ . The allocation
xt and the payment pt can depend on all types reported (vsi )s≤t,i∈N by the agents prior to time t.
We assume that the agent has an outside option of zero and thus require the following deﬁnition:
1

The restriction to ﬂow payments is without loss of generality as the agent can commit to future payments. More

precisely if a contract requires the agent to make a lump sum payment at time t the contract can instead require
the agent to make ﬂow payments from time t to time T without changing the agents incentives or the expected
discounted revenue of the principal.
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Deﬁnition 2 (Incentive Compatibility). A contract (xt , pt )t∈R+ is incentive compatible if for every
agent i it is individually rational to accept the contract
V i (θi ) ≥ 0 for all θi ∈ Θ ,
and it is optimal to report his type (vti )t∈R+ truthfully at every point in time t ∈ R+ .

4

Welfare Maximization

This section ﬁrst derives the social welfare maximizing allocation in the complete information set-up
and later shows how it can be implemented using dynamic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments.
Let us ﬁrst assume that the social planner observes the valuations vt of all agents at every point in
time directly. Given the transferable utility, we deﬁne the ﬂow welfare function s : R+ ×Rn ×X → R
that maps an allocation x ∈ X and a vector of valuations v ∈ Rn into the associated ﬂow of welfare
v i u(t, xi ) − c(x) .

s(t, v, x) =

(10)

i∈N

The social value of the allocation process (xt )t∈[0,T ] aggregates the discounted ﬂow of social welfare
over time and is given by:

T
E
e−rt
0


vti ui (t, xit )

− c (xt ) dt = E

i∈N



T
0

e

−rt

s(t, vt , xt )dt .

(11)

As the allocation xt at time t does not inﬂuence the future evolution of valuations or the set of
possible future allocations the problem of ﬁnding a socially eﬃcient allocation is time-separable.
We deﬁne the optimal allocation function x† : R+ × Rn → P(X) that maps a point in time t and a
vector of valuations v into the set of optimal allocations
X † (t, v) = arg max s(t, v, x) .
x∈X

(12)

An allocation process (xt )t∈[0,T ] is welfare maximizing if and only if xt ∈ X † (t, vt ) almost surely
for every t ∈ [0, T ]. The following theorem establishes the existence of a welfare maximizing
mechanism:2
2

While Theorem 1 shows that there exists a welfare maximizing allocation that can be implemented there nev-

ertheless might exist welfare maximizing allocation processes that can not be implemented. Such a situation can
arise if the set X † (t, v) contains more than one element and the selection made by the welfare maximizing allocation
process conditions on past valuations.
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Theorem 1 (Welfare Maxizing Mechanism). Any welfare maximizing allocation x† : R+ × Rn →
X † (t, v) that at time t depends only on the vector of valuations vt can be implemented in ex post
equilibrium via the static Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments


p†t i  p† i (t, vt ) = max
x∈X


u(t, x) − u(t, x† (t, vt )) vtj − c(x) + c(x† (t, vt )) .

(13)

j=i

Proof. As the allocation and the payment at time t depends only on the vector of valuations vt
agents do not need to report their types θ. As the allocation x† and the payments p† at time t
depend only on the vector of time t valuations vt the reporting problem is time separable and it is
optimal for the agent to report his valuation truthful if and only if for all t ∈ R+ and all v, v̂ i :
v i u(t, x† (t, v)) − p† (t, v) ≥ v i u(t, x† (t, (v̂ i , v −i ))) − p† (t, (v̂ i , v −i )) .
If follows from the static VCG argument that reporting v̂ti instead of his true type vti is not a
proﬁtable deviation for agent i at time t


vti u(t, x† (t, (v̂ti , vt−i ))) − max
x∈X


u(t, x) − u(t, x† (t, (v̂ti , vt−i ))) vtj − c(x) + c(x† (t, vt ))

j=i

vtj u(t, x† (t, (v̂ti , vt−i ))) − c(x† (t, (v̂ti , vt−i ))) − max

=

x∈X

j∈N

vti u(t, x† (t, vt )) − c(x† (t, vt )) − max

≤

x∈X

j∈N

5

u(t, x)vtj + c(x)
j=i

u(t, x)vtj + c(x) = vti u(t, x(t, vt )) − pi (t, vt ) .
j=i

Revenue Maximization

In this section we derive a revenue maximizing direct mechanism. Without loss of generality we
restrict attention to direct mechanisms, where every agent i report his type vti truthfully. To do so
we ﬁrst proof a revenue equivalence result for incentive compatible mechanisms.

5.1

Necessity

We begin by establishing that the value function of the agent if he reports truthfully is Lipschitz
continuous. As φi is strictly increasing in w we can implicitly deﬁne the function ω : R+ ×Θ×R → R
by
v i = φi (t, θ, ω(t, θi , v i )) for all (t, θi ) ∈ R+ × Θ .

(14)
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We derive a necessary condition for incentive compatibility that is based only on the robustness of
the mechanism to a small class of deviations, which we refer to as consistent deviations.
Deﬁnition 3 (Consistent Deviation).
A deviation by agent i is referred to as a consistent deviation if an agent with type v0 = φ(0, a, W0 )
(and associated initial shock a ∈ Θ) misreports v0 = φ(0, b, W0 ) (and associated initial shock b ∈ Θ)
at t = 0 continues to report:
vti = φ(t, b, ω(t, a, vti )),

(15)

instead of his true type vti at all future dates t ∈ R+ .
Thus, an agent who misreports with a consistent deviation, continues to misreport his type
vti in all future periods.

More precisely, agent i’s reported type v̂ti = φ(t, b, Wti ) equals the type

he would have had if his initial shock would have been b instead of a. We note that the consistent
misreport has the property that the principal could infer from the misreport the true realized path of
contemporaneous shocks Wti . Now, since the allocation depends on the type vti rather than the path
of contemporaneous shocks Wti , the (inferred) truthfulness in the shocks is not of immediate use for
the principal. We now show that this, one-dimensional, class of consistent deviations is suﬃcient
to uniquely pin down the value function of the agent in any incentive compatible mechanism at
time t = 0. We should emphasize that in contrast to the deviations analyzed in the literature, in
particular with respect to the necessary conditions, the class of consistent deviations we consider
here are not local deviations at one point in time, but rather represent a global deviation in the
sense that the agent changes his reports at every point in time.3
As φ(0, θ, W0 ) is strictly increasing in θ, it is convenient to describe the initial report directly
in terms of the true initial shock a and the reported initial shock b. We thus deﬁne V (a, b) to be
the indirect utility of an agent with initial shock a but who reports shock b and misreports his type
consistently as v̂ti = φ(t, b, ω(t, a, vti )). Note that by construction Wti = ω(t, a, vti ). Consequently the
allocation agent i gets by consistently reporting b is the same allocation xit (b) an agent of initial
3

Eso and Szentes (2014) establish revenue equivalence using a similar class of one-dimensional deviations where

the agent reports his orthogonal shocks after time zero truthfully. As the principal can infer the valuation from the
observation of Wt a consistent deviation in our model corresponds to a deviation where the agent reports Wt truthful
for all t > 0.
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shock b gets if he reports truthfully. Hence V i (a, b) is the indirect utility of an agent who has the
initial shock a but reports initial shock b and misreports his type consistently and is given by:
 T


i
−rt
i
i
i
V (a, b) = E
u(t, xt (b))φ(t, a, Wt ) − pt (b) dt .
e
0

Note, that when restricted to consistent deviations the mechanism design problem turns into a
standard one-dimensional problem, and the Envelope theorem yields the derivative of the indirect
utility function of the agent:
Proposition 1 (Regularity of Value Function).
The indirect utility function V i of every agent i ∈ N in any incentive compatible mechanism is
absolutely continuous and has the weak derivative
 T

i
−rt
i
i
i
Vθ (θ) = E
e u(t, xt (θ))φθ (t, θ , Wt )dt a.e. .

(16)

0

Proof. As the agent can always use consistent deviations, a necessary condition for incentive compatibility is V (a, a) = supb V (a, b) . As φ is diﬀerentiable the derivative of V with respect to the
ﬁrst variable is given by
 T


∂
−rt
i
i
i
Va (a, b) =
u(t, xt (b))φ(t, a, Wt ) − pt (b) dt
E
e
∂a
0


 T

−rt
i
i
u(t, xt (b))φθ (t, a, Wt ) dt ≤ u E
e
= E
0



T
0

e

−rt

φθ (t, a, Wti )dt

,

which is bounded by a constant by Assumption 3. By the Envelope theorem (see Milgrom and
Segal (2002), Theorem 1 and Theorem 2) we have that V i (θ) = V i (θ, θ) is absolutely continuous
an the (weak) derivative is given by (16).

We introduce the virtual valuation function J : R+ × Θ × R → R as:
J(t, θi , v i ) = v i −

1 − F (θi )
φθ (t, θi , w(t, θi , v i )) .
f (θi )

The properties of the virtual valuation are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (Monotonicity of the Virtual Valuation).
If the virtual valuation J(t, θi , v i ) is positive then it is non-decreasing in θi and v i .

(17)
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Proof. As there is no risk of confusing agents we drop the upper indices in the proof and denote
by (θ, v) the type and the valuation of agent i. Assume that the virtual valuation is positive
J(t, θ, v) > 0. We ﬁrst prove the monotonicity in v and than in θ.
Part 1: J(t, θ, v) > 0 ⇒ Jv (t, θ, v) ≥ 0:
Note that


1 − F (θ) φθ (t, θ, w(t, θ, v))
1 − F (θ)
φθ (t, θ, w(t, θ, v)) = v 1 −
.
J(t, θ, v) = v −
f (θ)
f (θ) φ(t, θ, w(t, θ, v))
As φθ > 0 it follows that J(t, θ, v) ≤ v and hence v ≥ 0. Consequently the second term needs to
be positive as well. Clearly, v → v is non-decreasing. As φθ /φ is non-increasing in w by (6) and
w(t, θ, v) is increasing in v, so the second term is increasing in v.
Part 2: J(t, θ, v) > 0 ⇒ Jθ (t, θ, v) ≥ 0 :
It remains to prove that the virtual valuation J(t, θ, v) = v −
decreasing in θ. First, note that

1−F (θ)
f (θ)

1−F (θ)
φθ (t, θ, w(t, θ, v))
f (θ)

is non-

is non-increasing in θ by assumption. Second, note that

0 = φθ + φw wθ and hence
∂
φθ (t, θ, w(t, θ, v)) = φθθ (t, θ, w(t, θ, v)) + φθw (t, θ, w(t, θ, v))wθ (t, θ, v)
∂θ
φθ (t, θ, w(t, θ, v))
.
= φθθ (t, θ, w(t, θ, v)) − φθw (t, θ, w(t, θ, v))
φw (t, θ, w(t, θ, v))
Now we replace w(t, θ, v) by w and prove that the derivative is negative for any w ∈ R :


φθθ (t, θ, w) φθw (t, θ, w)
= φθ (t, θ, w)
−
φθ (t, θ, w)
φw (t, θ, w)


∂
∂
log(φθ (t, θ, w)) −
log(φw (t, θ, w)
= φθ (t, θ, w)
∂θ
∂θ


∂
φθ (t, θ, w)
= φθ (t, θ, w) log
∂θ
φw (t, θ, w)
≤ 0.
The last step follows as

φθ (t,θ,w)
φw (t,θ,w)

is decreasing in θ by (7), and so the logarithm is decreasing as

well.
We observe that Proposition 2 establishes the monotonicity of the virtual valuation only for
the case that the virtual valuation is positive. In fact, our assumptions are not strong enough to
ensure the monotonicity of the virtual valuation independent of its sign. The reason not to impose
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stronger monotonicity conditions is that for many important examples discussed later (for example
the geometric Brownian motion with unknown initial value) the virtual valuation is only monotone
if positive.
We can now establish a revenue equivalence result that describes the revenue of the principal in
any incentive compatible mechanism solely in terms of the allocation process x = (xt )t∈R+ and the
expected time zero value the lowest type derives from the contract V i (θ).
Theorem 2 (Revenue Equivalence).
For any incentive compatible direct mechanism the expected payoﬀ of the principal depends only on
the allocation process (xt )t∈R+ and is given by the virtual value:


T
T
−rt
i
e
pt − c(xt ) dt = E
e−rt
J(t, θti , vti )u(t, xit ) − c(xt ) dt −
E
0

0

i∈N

i∈N

V i (θ). (18)
i∈N

Proof. Partial integration gives that in any incentive compatible mechanism (x, p) the expected
transfer received by the principal from agent i equals the expected virtual valuation of agent i :

 T
  θ
 T
−rt i
−rt
i i
e pt dt = E
e u(t, xt )vt dt −
f (θi )V i (θi )dθi
E
0


=E

=E

0

T
0
T
0





θ

1 − F (θi ) i i i
Vθ (θ )dθ − V i (θ)
i)
f
(θ
θ

 
1 − F (θi )
−rt
i
i
i
i
φθ (t, θ , Wt ) dt − V i (θ) .
e u(t, xt ) vt −
f (θi )
e−rt u(t, xit )vti dt −

θ

f (θi )

Summing up the transfers of all agents and subtracting the cost gives the result.
As Theorem 2 provides a necessary condition for incentive compatibility it follows that if there
exists an incentive compatible contract (x, p) such that the allocation process x maximizes the
expected virtual valuation given by (18) it maximizes the principal’s surplus. Clearly, to maximize
the virtual surplus it is optimal to set the transfer to the lowest initial shock equal to zero: V i (θ) = 0
for all agents i ∈ N . The revenue of the principal deﬁned by (18) equals the expected welfare when
true valuations are replaced with virtual valuations:
 T

−rt
E
e s(t, J(t, θt , vt ), xt )dt .

(19)

0

In the next step we establish that there exists a direct mechanism that maximizes the expected
virtual value deﬁned in (18). To do so let us ﬁrst state the following lemma which ensure that there
exists a time separable allocation that maximizes the virtual value:
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Proposition 3 (Virtual Value Maximizing Allocation).
There exists an allocation function x : R+ × Θ × Rn → X such that the process
xt  xt (t, θ, vt )
maximizes the expected virtual valuation of the principal deﬁned in (17). Furthermore, the allocation
x i (t, θ, vt ) of agent i is non-decreasing in his valuation vti and his initial type θi .
Proof. For every t, θ, vt there exists a non-empty set of allocations which maximize the ﬂow of
virtual values4
J(t, θj , vtj )u(t, xj ) − c(x).

X  (t, θ, vt ) = arg max s(t, J(t, θ, vt ), x) = arg max
x∈X

x∈X

j∈N

As u and c are increasing in xi is is optimal to set the consumption of agent i to zero xi = 0 if his
virtual valuation J(t, θi , vti ) is negative. As u is increasing in x and J is increasing in θi and v i by

Proposition 2 it follows that the objective function of the principal i∈N max{0, J(t, θi , vti )}u(t, xi )−
c(x) is super-modular in (θi , xi ) and (vti , xi ). By Topkis’ theorem, there exists a quantity x (t, θ, vt ) ∈
X  (t, θ, vt ) that maximizes the ﬂow virtual value such that the allocation x i (t, θ, vt ) of agent i is
non-decreasing in θi and vti . As the virtual value of the principal at time t depends only on t, the
initial reports θ, and the type vt , this ﬂow allocation that conditions only on (t, θ, vt ) is an optimal
allocation process:

sup E
(xt )

5.2



T
0

e

−rt

s(t, J(t, θti , vti ), xt )dt


=E



T
0

e

−rt

sup s(t, J(t, θti , vti ), xt )dt
x∈X

.

Suﬃciency

To prove incentive compatibility of the optimal allocation process let us ﬁrst establish a version of
a classic result in static mechanism design.
Proposition 4 (Static Implementation).
Let y ⊂ R and let β : Y × Y → R be absolutely continuous in the ﬁrst variable with weak derivative
β1 : Y × Y → R+ and let β1 be increasing in the second variable. Then the payment
 y
p(y) = β(y, y) −
β1 (z, z)dz .
0

ensures that truth-telling is optimal, i.e. β(y, y) − p(y) ≥ β(y, ŷ) − p(ŷ) for all y, ŷ ∈ Y .
4

We denote by J(t, θ, vt ) ∈ Rn the vector of virtual valuations, i.e. J(t, θ, vt )i = J(t, θi , vti ).
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Proof. We have that




ŷ



y

ŷ

β(y, ŷ) − p(ŷ) = β(y, ŷ) − β(ŷ, ŷ) +
β1 (z, z)dz =
β1 (z, ŷ)dz +
β1 (z, z)dz
0
ŷ
0
 y
 y
 y
=
β1 (z, ŷ) − β1 (z, z)dz +
β1 (z, z)dz ≤
β1 (z, z)dz = β(y, y) − p(y) .
0

ŷ

0

In the ﬁrst step we construct ﬂow payments that make truthful reporting of valuations optimal
(on and oﬀ the equilibrium path) if the virtual valuation maximizing allocation process x is implemented. Deﬁne the payment process qt  q(t, θ, vt ) where the ﬂow payment q i : t × Θ × Rn → R of
agent i is given by:

q (t, θ, vt ) 
i

vti

u(t, x (t, θ, vt )) −

vti

i

0

u(t, x i (t, θ, (vt−i , z)))dz .

Proposition 5 (Incentive Compatible Transfers).
In the contract (x , q) it is optimal for every agent at every point in time t > 0 to report her
valuation vti truthfully, irrespective of the reported types θ and reported prior valuations (vs )s<t .
Proof. As the allocation x (t, θ, vt ) and the payment q(t, θ, vt ) at time t are independent of all past
reported valuations (vs )s<t the reporting problem of the agent is time-separable. As u is increasing
in x, and x is increasing in v i by Proposition 2, we can apply Proposition 4 to
(v i , v̂ i ) → v i u(t, x (t, θ, (v̂ i , v −i ))) ,
and so guarantee that the payment scheme q(t, θ, v) makes truthful reporting of valuations optimal
for all t, θ, v, v̂ i .
It remains to augment the payments from Proposition 5 with additional payments that make it
optimal for the agents to report their initial types θ truthfully. Note, that as the payments from
Proposition 5 ensure truthful reporting of valuations even after initial misreports, we know how
agents will behave even after an initial deviation. This insight transforms the time zero reporting
problem into a static design problem in which the payments from Proposition 4 can be used to
provide incentives.
Deﬁne the payment process
pt  q(t, θ, vt ) + m(θ)
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where the ﬁxed ﬂow payment mi : Θ → R of agent i is given by:

m (θ) = E

re−rt 
1 − e−rT

T

i

0





vti
0

u(t, x i (t, θ, (z, vt−i )))dz

θi

−

φθ (t, z, Wti )u(t, x i (t, (z, θ−i ), (φ(t, z, Wti ), v −i )))dz

θ




dt .

Theorem 3 (Revenue Maximizing Contract).
In the contract (x , p ) it is optimal for every agent at every point in time t > 0 to report her type
and valuation vti truthfully, irrespective of the reported types θ and reported prior valuations (vs )s<t .
Proof. Start with the ﬂow payments q of Proposition 5. By construction of the payments each
agent reports his type truthfully independent of his initial report θ. Let V̂ (θi , θ̂i ) be the agent’s
value if she is of initial type θi reports θ̂i and reports truthful after time zero (not that this is not!
a consistent, but an optimal deviation after time zero)
 T
 

i i
−rt
i
i
i −i
i −i
V̂ (θ , θ̂ ) = E
e
vt u(t, x (t, (θ̂ , θ ), vt )) − q(t, (θ̂ , θ ), vt ) dt .
0

As it is optimal to report vti truthfully we have that

∂  i
i
i −i
i −i
u(t,
x
(t,
(
θ̂
,
θ
),
v
))
−
q(t,
(
θ̂
,
θ
),
v
)
= u(t, x (t, (θ̂i , θ−i ), vt )) .
v
t
t
∂vti t
Thus, the derivative of agent i’s value with respect to his initial type is given by
 T
 

i i
−rt
i
i
i
i −i
V̂θi (θ , θ̂ ) = E
e
φθ (t, θ , Wt ) u(t, x (t, (θ̂ , θ ), vt )) dt .

(20)

0

As φθ is positive, u is increasing in x, and x i is increasing in θ̂i by Proposition 2, Proposition
4 implies that truthful reporting of θi is optimal for agent i if he has to make a payment of
mi (θ)(1 − e−r T )/r at time zero. As the agent can commit to payments we can transform this
payment into a constant ﬂow payment with the same discounted present value by multiplying with
r/(1 − e−r T ). Note, that as the payment does not depend on the valuations it is optimal for the
agent to report his valuations truthfully in the contract (x , p ) where pt  q(t, θ, vt ) + m(θ).
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5.3

Return to the Initial Example

Let us now return to the example discussed in Section 2. In this section we discussed that in the
single agent case where the valuation follows a (shifted) geometric Brownian Motion a menu over
static two part tariﬀs is revenue maximizing. Thus, let v be a shifted geometric Brownian motion,
i.e. dvt = (vt − v)dt. Let the initial value of the process be the private information of the agent
θ = v0 distributed according to F : [v, v] → [0, 1] such that f (v) ≥ 1/v.
Proposition 6.
An indirect, revenue maximizing mechanism is given by a menu of prices (parametrized over z) of
the form
pt ≡ p(z, xt ) = z + A(z)c(xt ) − (A(z) − 1)v
Note, that the optimality of two part tariﬀs in the single agent case does not rely on the
assumptions made in Proposition 6 and we have the following general result:
Proposition 7 (Two Part Tariﬀs).
There exist a revenue maximizing two part tariﬀ, where at time zero the agent communicates θ
truthfully and then at every point in time t chooses his consumption xt and pays p̃(t, θ, xt ) .
Proof. Deﬁne the set valuations such that a given allocation x is optimal at time t
V  (t, θ, x) = {v ∈ R : x = X  (t, θ, v)} .
We can deﬁne the payment as ∞ if an allocation is never optimal, i.e. V  = ∅. For every allocation
x such that V  (t, θ, x) = ∅ there exists at least one valuation v such that the agent would receive this
allocation x if he reports v in the direct mechanism of Theorem 3. The payment of the mechanism
described in Theorem 3 depends only on the allocation, but not on the valuation v. Thus, we have
that the following payment implements the virtual valuation maximizing allocation in an indirect
mechanism:
p̃(t, θ, x) =

⎧
⎪
⎨inf{p(t, θ, v) : v ∈ V  (t, θ, x)},

if V  (t, θ, x) = ∅;

⎪
⎩∞,

else .
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5.4

A Closer Look at the Related Literature

Our model can be understood as a generalization of the setup analyzed Eső and Szentes (2007). Eső
and Szentes consider a two period model in which a single allocative decision is made in the second
period. They show that in every two period model, where one signal arrives at the beginning of
every period, one can represent the type after the arrival of the second period signal as a function
of the ﬁrst period and an independent second period signal5 . In our setup we assume an identical
signal structure to exist in continuous time. The type at every point in time vt can be represented
as a function φ of the initial shock θi and an independent time t signal Wt , i.e. vt = φ(t, θi , Wti ).
Note, that while Eső and Szentes prove the existence of such a signal decomposition we need to
assume it as even in a three period model the valuation might depend on all the signals that arrive
after time zero.
Our Assumptions 1 and 2 are similar to the Assumptions 1 and 2 made in Eső and Szentes.
More precisely in Lemma 2 Eső and Szentes show that their Assumption 1 is equivalent to (in our
notation)
φθw (t, θ, w) ≤ 0,

(A)

and their Assumption 2 is equivalent to (in our notation)
φθw (t, θ, w)
φθθ (t, θ, w)
≤
.
φθ (t, θ, w)
φw (t, θ, w)

(B)

As
∂ φθ
φθw φ − φθ φw
=
,
∂w φ
φ2
Assumption 1 of Eső and Szentes implies our Assumption 1 and is thus stronger. As


φθθ φw − φθ φθw
φθ φθθ φθw
∂ φθ
=
=
−
∂θ φw
φ2w
φw φθ
φw
Assumption 2 of our setup is exactly equivalent to Assumption 2 in Eső and Szentes. Hence, the
basic conditions on the payoﬀs and the shocks extend the conditions in Eső and Szentes directly to
an environment with many periods and many (ﬂow) allocation decisions.
However, the proof strategy here departs substantially from the one pursued in Eső and Szentes
and oﬀers an arguably more direct route to the derivation of the revenue maximizing contract. A
5

In Eső and Szentes the function φ is called ui , the ﬁrst period signal θi is called vi and the independent signal

Wti in period t = 2 is called si .
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direct comparison might be informative for the reader. The derivation of the optimal mechanism
in Eső and Szentes proceeds in two steps.
First, they derive the optimal mechanism when the second period signal is directly observed by
the principal, so that the private information of the agents consists only of the ﬁrst period signal.
This establishes an upper bound on the revenue that the principal can achieve when all signals are
private information to the agent, their Proposition 1. We omit this step completely and directly
establish the revenue equivalence result by means of the consistent deviations.
Second, they establish that the upper bound derived in Proposition 1 can be achieved, i.e.
there are transfers that make the allocation incentive compatible. To characterize the incentive
constraints in the ﬁrst period, Eső and Szentes integrate over the second period continuation payoﬀs.
This approach relies on a backward induction argument that requires recursively integrating over
all future period payoﬀs, which makes it diﬃcult to extend the argument beyond the two period
setting. In Lemma 3, they derive restrictions on the payoﬀs if the agent reported truthfully in ﬁrst
period and is induced to be report thruthfully in the second period. In Lemma 4, it is established
that in any incentive compatible mechanism, conditional on a deviation in the ﬁrst period, in the
second period it is optimal for the agent to misreport “to correct for his lie” in terms of the ﬁnal
valuation for the object.6 With the determination of the optimal strategy in the second period,
Lemma 5 then establishes the value of a deviation in the ﬁrst period in any incentive compatible
mechanism. And ﬁnally, Lemma 6 establishes the revenue equivalence result from the point of view
of the agent’s expected utility. Theorem 1 then recovers the revenue of the principal and shows
that it achieves the upper bound established in Proposition 1.
By contrast, we aggregate the shocks, the initial shock and all subsequent shocks, in a single
type, a suﬃcient statistic for the private information of the agent. We then establish the revenue
equivalence result directly with a single class of deviations, the consistent deviations, by ﬁrst establishing (Lipschitz) continuity of the value function of the agent, our Proposition 1, and then
directly establishing revenue equivalence from the principal’s point of view, our Theorem 2. The
consistent deviations have the crucial property that their expectation (beyond the initial shock) can
6

A methodological drawback of requiring the agent to correct his lie is that it requires a full support assumption

to ensure that after every history there exists a signal that leads to any type. While a correcting report does not
exist if the full support assumption is not satisﬁed, by contrast a consistent report is always well deﬁned.
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be computed by the same probability measure as the true type, and hence when we compute the
value function of the agent (and obtain the revenue equivalence result) we do not have to appeal
to a recursive argument at all, but rather form a single expectation conditioning only on the initial
shock. As we establish the revenue equivalence (and the optimal mechanism) by using only a small
class of deviations, we then have to verify the incentive compatibility with respect to all possible
deviations to complete the argument. Now, the allocation of the optimal mechanism can be shown
to depend only on the initial type and the current type, our Proposition 3. Moreover, the incentive constraints of the agent, conditional on the allocation plan, depends only on his current type.
Thus, by standard arguments of static incentive compatibility, our Proposition 5, we can ﬁnd ﬂow
payments such that the agent reports truthfully irrespective of the initial report, our Proposition 6.
Finally, Theorem 3, using a simple supermodularity argument shows that we can complement the
ﬂow transfers with initial payments to get truthful initial reports, which in turn lead to the value
function.
Similar to the handicap auction of Esö and Szentes the revenue maximizing mechanism in our
setting only discriminates based on the initial shock.
Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014) observed in the context of a discrete time environment that
time-separability of the allocation plus monotonicity of the virtual valuation in θi and vti is suﬃcient
to ensure strong monotonicity of the virtual valuation maximizing allocation (monotonicity in θi
and vti after every history). Furthermore, they show that strong monotonicity is suﬃcient for the
implementability of the virtual valuation maximizing allocation (Corollary 1).
As the allocation at time t does not change the set of possible allocations at later times our
environment is time-separable. Our assumptions are similar to the assumptions made in the section
discussing separable environments in Pavan, Segal, and Toikka in the sense that they ensure strong
monotonicity which in turn implies implementability of the virtual value maximizing allocation.
However, our assumption on the stochastic process, are weaker than the assumptions made on the
primitives in Proposition 1 in Pavan, Segal, and Toikka to allow for the geometric Brownian motion.
The reason we can establish suﬃciency under weaker assumptions on the stochastic process lies in
the multiplicative separable structure we assume between the valuation and the allocation.
Note, that the revenue maximizing mechanism proposed in this paper is a menu over static
contracts. This means that payments and allocations at time t depend only on the time t valuations
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and the time zero types. In Pavan, Segal, and Toikka allocations and payments depend on the
complete history of valuations.
A major advantage of the continuous time model is that it allows us to easily obtain closed
form expressions for the revenue maximizing mechanism. This enables us to analyze the distortion
introduced due to revenue maximization under diﬀerent informational assumptions in the next
section.

6

Long-run Behavior of the Distortion

In this section we analyze how the distortion behaves in the long-run. We are interested in the
expected social welfare generated by the revenue maximizing allocation compared to the expected
welfare generated by the socially optimal allocation.

6.1

Necessary and Suﬃcient Conditions

We make the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 4 (Vanishing Distortion).
The distortion vanishes over time if the social welfare generated by the revenue maximizing allocation
converges to the social welfare generated by the socially optimal allocation:



lim E s t, vt , x(t, vt ) − s t, vt , x(t, J(t, θ, vt )) .

t→∞

Proposition 8 (Long-run Behaviour of the Distortion).
The following two statements characterize the long-run behavior of the distortion:
(a) The distortion vanishes in the long run if the expected valuation of any type converges to the
expected valuation of the lowest type, i.e.




lim E vt | θi = x − E vt | θi = θ → 0 .

t→∞

(21)

(b) If n = 1, u(t, x) = x, c is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly convex with 0 < c ≤ D
and the expected valuation of any type does not converges to the expected valuation of the lowest
type (i.e. (21) is not satisﬁed) then the distortion does not vanish.
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Proof. First note that the diﬀerence in the expected type to the lowest initial shock equals






E vt | θi = x − E vt | θi = θ = E φ(t, θi , Wti ) − φ(t, θ, Wti )

= E [(1 −


F (z))φ(t, z, Wti )]z=θ
z=θ



θ

+
θ

f (z)φ(t, z, Wti )dz

1 − F (z)
φθ (t, z, Wti )f (z)dz
f
(z)
θ


1 − F (θi )
i
i
=E
φθ (t, θ , Wt ) .
f (θi )


1−F (θ i )
Part (a): We prove that the distortion vanishes if limt→∞ E f (θi ) φθ (t, θ, Wt ) = 0. We ﬁrst
=E

θ

show that the welfare loss at a ﬁxed point in time can be bounded by the diﬀerence between virtual
valuation J ∈ Rn and valuation v ∈ Rn
s(t, v, x (t, v)) − s(t, v, x (t, J))
v i u(t, x i (t, v)) − c(x (t, v))

=

−

i∈N

v i u(t, x i (t, J)) − c(x (t, J))
i∈N

v i u(t, x i (t, v)) − c(x (t, v))

=

−

i∈N

J i u(t, x i (t, J)) − c(x (t, J))
i∈N

(vi − J i )u(t, x i (t, J))

−
i∈N

v i u(t, x i (t, v)) − c(x (t, v))

≤
i∈N

−

J i u(t, x i (t, v)) − c(x (t, v))
i∈N

(vi − J i )u(t, x i (t, J))

−
i∈N

(v i − J i )(u(t, x i (t, v)) − u(t, x i (t, J)).

=
i∈N

As the set of possible allocations X is compact and u is continuous there exists a constant C > 0
such that
(v i − J i )(u(t, x i (t, v)) − u(t, x i (t, J)) ≤ C
i∈N

(v i − J i ) .
i∈N

Hence the welfare loss resulting from the revenue maximizing allocation resulting from the revenue
maximizing allocation is linearly bounded by the diﬀerence between virtual and real valuation. As
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the diﬀerence between vti and Jti equals

1−F (θ i )
φθ (t, θi , Wti )
f (θ i )

it follows that


E [s(t, vt , x (t, vt )) − s(t, vt , x (t, Jt ))] ≤ C E

(v i − J i )


i∈N

1 − F (θi )
φθ (t, θi , Wti )
i)
f
(θ
i∈N




= C E vt | θ i = x − E v t | θ i = θ .

=CE

Taking the limit t → ∞ gives the result.
Part (b): We prove that the distortion does not vanish in the long run if the expected type of any
initial shock does not converge to the expected type of the lowest initial shock. First, we prove that
the distortion changes the allocation. As u(t, x) = x is linear and c is convex this implies that the
function x → vx − c(x) is concave and has an interior maximizer for every (t, v). This implies that
for every point in time t and every valuation v
0 = v − c (x (t, v)) .
By the implicit function theorem
xv (t, v) =

1
1
≥
.
c (x (t, v))
D

Intuitively this means that the allocation is responsive to the type v. We calculate the change in
social welfare induced by the type v and the virtual valuation J
s(t, v, x (t, v)) − s(t, v, x (t, J)) = [vx (t, v) − c(x (t, v))] − [vx (t, J) − c(x (t, J))]
 v
x (t, z)dz − (v − J)x (t, J)
=
J v
x (t, z) − x (t, J)dz
=
J

(v − J)2
1 v
.
(z − J)dz =
≥
D J
2D
As the diﬀerence between valuation and virtual valuation is given by

1−F (θ i )
φθ (t, θi , Wti )
f (θ i )

taking
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expectations yields


1
1 − F (θi )
i
i 2
E [s(t, v, x(v)) − s(t, v, x(J))] ≥
E (
φθ (t, θ , Wt ))
2D
f (θi )

2
1 − F (θi )
1
i
i
E (
φθ (t, θ , Wt ))
≥
2D
f (θi )
E [vt | θi = x] − E [vt | θi ]
,
=
2D
where the middle step follows from Jensen’s inequality.

7

Sequential Auctions and Distortions

We now illustrate some of our general results within the context of a sequential auction model. The
allocation problem is as follows. At every point in time t, the owner of a single unit of a, possibly
divisible, object wishes to allocate it among the competing bidders, i = 1, ..., n. The allocation

i
space is given in every period t by xit ∈ [0, 1] and N
i=1 xt ≤ 1. The marginal cost of providing the
object is constant and normalized to zero within the constraint of a single unit. The ﬂow utility of
each agent i is described by
vti · xit − pit .
Thus, we assume that ui (t, xit ) = xit for all i and ti , and hence vti immediately represents the
willingness to pay of the agent in period t. We can interpret the allocation process as a process
of intertemporal licensing where the current use of the object is determined on the basis of the
past and current reports of the agents, and in particular, the assignment of the object can move
back and forth between the competing agents. Alternatively, the description of the valuation could
be rephrased as a description of the marginal cost of producing a single good, and the associated
allocation process is the solution to a long-term procurement contract with competing producers.
As in the static theory of optimal procurement, the virtual valuation would then be replaced by the
virtual cost, but the structure of the allocation process would remain intact.
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7.1

Arithmetic Brownian Motion

In the opening example we represented the valuation process by a geometric Brownian motion,
now we represent the valuation process by the arithmetic Brownian motion, thus indicating the
versatility of the current approach. We are particularly interested in discussing how the nature of
the private information rent, as captured by the virtual utility, changes over time, and inﬂuences
the allocation process. We also derive an associated payment process pit which guarantees that the
interim participation constraint of all agents and all types is maintained throughout the dynamic
mechanism.
The arithmetic Brownian motion vti is completely described by its initial value v0i and the drift
μ and the variance σ of the diﬀusion process Wt . The willingness to pay of agent i therefore evolves
according to:
dvti = μdt + σdWti ,
so that the type of agent i, his willingness to pay, can be represented as:
vti = v0i + μt + σWti .

(22)

Interestingly, we can analyze the incentive problem when either one of the three determinants of the
Brownian motion, the initial value, the drift or the variance is unknown, whereas the remaining two
are commonly known. Below, we begin the analysis with the case of an unknown initial value, then
consider the case of unknown drift , and ﬁnally the case of unknown variance. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd
that even though we consider the same stochastic process, the nature of the private information,
i.e. about which aspect of the process the agent is privately informed, has a substantial impact on
the optimal allocation. In particular, we ﬁnd that the distortion is either constant, increasing or
random (and increasing in expectation) depending on the precise nature of the private information.
Unknown Initial Value We begin with the case where the initial value of the Brownian motion,
v0i = θi , is private information to agent i, as are all future realizations of the Brownian motion, vti .
In contrast, the drift μ and the variance σ of the Brownian motion are assumed to be commonly
known. Given the above representation of the Brownian motion, we have
vt = φ(t, θi , Wti ) = θi + μt + σWti .

(23)
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We can immediately verify that the partial derivative of φ with respect to θ is given by φθ = 1. It
follows that the virtual valuation is given by:
J i (t, θi , vti ) = vti −

1 − F (θi )
,
f (θi )

(24)

and we ﬁnd that the distortion imposed by the revenue maximizing mechanism is constant over
time. In every period, the object is allocated to the agent i∗t with the highest virtual utility, provided
that the valuation is positive: Thus, the allocation proceeds by ﬁnding the bidder with the highest
valuation, after taking into account a handicap, that is determined once and for all through the
report of the initial shock.
Earlier, we gave a general description of the payments decomposed into an annualized up-front
payment z and a ﬂow payment pt . In the present auction environment, we can give an explicit
description of the ﬂow payments in terms of the virtual utility of the agents. The associated ﬂow
transfer of the bidders, pit , which also follows directly from the logic of the second price auction are
given by:

⎧


⎨ maxj=i v j − 1−F (θj j ) +
t
f (θ )
pit =
⎩
0,

1−F (θ i )
,
f (θ i )

if i = i∗t ;
if i = i∗t .

(25)

Thus, it is only the winning bidder who incurs a ﬂow payment. By rewriting (25), we ﬁnd that
the winning bidder has to pay his valuation, but receives a discount, namely his information rent,
which is exactly equal to the diﬀerence in the virtual utility between the winning bidder and the
next highest bidder, i.e.
∗
pit

=

∗
vti



i∗

− J (t, θ

i∗

∗
, vti )



J (t, θ
− max
∗
j

j=i

j

, vtj )




.

(26)

By construction of the transfer function, the ﬂow net utility of the bidder is positive whenever he
is assigned the object, as
∗
vti

∗

≥

vtj

1 − F (θj ) 1 − F (θi )
+
,
−
f (θj )
f (θi∗ )

(27)

and thus, the ﬂow allocation proceeds as a “handicap” second price auction, where the price of
the winner is determined by the current value of the second highest bidder, as measured by the
virtual utility, and the “handicap” is computed as the diﬀerence between the constant handicap
of the current winner and the current second highest bidder. The above version of the handicap
auction also appears in Eső and Szentes (2007) in a discrete time, two period model of a single unit
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auction. Similarly, Board (2007) develops a handicap auction in a discrete time, inﬁnite horizon
model, but where the object is allocated only once, at an optimal stopping time. There, the
handicap is represented as here, by the constant terms, (1 − F (θj )) /f (θj ) and (1 − F (θi )) /f (θi ),
but the second highest value is computed as the continuation value of the remaining bidders, as in
Bergemann and Välimäki (2010).
Unknown Drift We now consider the case where the initial private information of the agent is
with respect to the drift of the Brownian motion. Let vti ∈ R+ be an arithmetic Brownian motion
with drift θ and known variance σ and known initial value, v0i :
vt = φ(t, θi , Wti ) = v0i + μt + σWti .

(28)

The derivative of the valuation φ with respect to the initial private information θ, which now
represents the drift of the Brownian motion, is given by φθ = t. Thus the virtual valuation is now
given by:
J(t, θi , vti ) = vti −

1 − F (θi )
t.
f (θi )

(29)

The ﬂow payment can again be determined as before and is of exactly the same form as (26), and the
virtual utility function is given by (29). The distortion is still formed on the basis of the handicap,
by the inverse hazard rate (1 − F (θi )) /f (θi ), but interestingly, we now ﬁnd that the handicap is
increasing linearly in time. It follows that in the contrast to the above case of the unknown starting
value, the distortion is growing deterministically over time, and thus certainly not vanishing over
time. Since vti might be growing as well, the deterministic increase in the distortion however does not
allow us to conclude that the assignment of the object is terminated with probability one at some
ﬁnite time T , a conclusion that we will arrive at later when we consider the geometric Brownian
motion.
Unknown Variance We conclude the analysis of the arithmetic Brownian motion with the case
of unknown variance. The valuation vti then evolves according to:
vt = φ(t, θi , Wti ) = v0 + μt + θWti .

(30)

Now, the initial private information θ represents the volatility of the Brownian motion, another
structural parameter of the stochastic process, and thus the volatility of the valuation process. The
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derivative of the valuation φ with respect to the initial private information θ now takes the form:
φθ =

φ − v0 − μt
θ

In consequence the virtual valuation of agent i can be expressed as:
1 − F (θi ) vti − v0 − μt
J(t, θi , vti ) = vti −
f (θi )
θi


1 − F (θi )
1 − F (θi )
+
= vti 1 −
(v0 + μt).
f (θi )θi
f (θi )θi

(31)

The variance of the Brownian motion does not lend itself to an ordering of ﬁrst order stochastic
dominance, rather it is ordered to second order stochastic dominance. Formally, in the case of
unknown variance φ does not satisfy the assumptions φθ ≥ 0 and Assumption 2. Those assumptions
are only used to establish that the virtual valuation is increasing in θ, v if it takes positive values,
which we ensure here by assuming that μ, v0 ≤ 0.
The basic idea is to use the convexity of the objective function to guarantee that an increase in
variance leads to an increase in the expected (virtual) valuation. After all, if the virtual valuation
turns negative, the seller does not want to assign the object to the buyer, thus the revenue is ﬂat
and equal to zero. It therefore follows that the revenue of the seller naturally has a convex like
property. But in contrast to the utility of the buyer, which is linear in vt , and hence strictly convex
if truncated below by zero, the virtual valuation of the seller has additional terms, as displayed
by (31) which need to be controlled to guarantee the monotonicity of the virtual utility. From the
expression of the virtual utility function we can immediately derive suﬃcient conditions for the
monotonicity. Thus if we assume that the initial value v0 is negative, v0 ≤ 0, and the arithmetic
Brownian motion has a negative drift μ ≤ 0, then we are guaranteed that the convexity argument
is suﬃciently strong.
Formally, let θ̂ be the solution to θ̂ −

1−F (θ̂)
f (θ̂)

= 0. As


J(t, θ

i

, vti )

≤

vti

1 − F (θi )
1−
f (θi )θi



the virtual valuation J(t, θi , vti ) is only positive if the valuation vti is negative, for all θi < θ̂ . We
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ﬁrst show that this implies that the expected discounted payment of the agent is negative if θi < θ̂:
  T

 T
 

 T
1 − F (θi )
−rt i
−rt
i i
i
−rt i
i
E
e pt dt = E
e J(t, θ , vt )u(t, xt )dt ≤ 1 −
e vt u(t, xt )dt
E
f (θi )θi
0
0
0
  T

 T


1 − F (θi )
−rt i
−rt i
E
e pt dt ⇒ E
e pt dt ≤ 0 .
≤ 1−
f (θi )θi
0
0
Hence, it can never be optimal to allocate to an agent with variance θi < θ̂. Thus, we ignore agents
with low variance θi < θ and never allocate the object to them. As

1−F (θ)
f (θ)

is non-increasing we have

(θ)
that 1 − 1−F
> 0 for all θ > θ̂ and hence J(t, θi , vti ) is increasing in vti and θi for all vti > 0 , θi > θ̂.
f (θ)θ

Hence, by the argument of Proposition 5, there exists a payment such that truthful reporting of
valuations becomes optimal irrespective of the reported types. As the virtual valuation
J(t, θi , φ(t, θi , Wti )) = Wti (θ −

1 − F (θ)
) + μt + v0
f (θ)

is increasing in θ whenever Wti > 0 and decreasing whenever Wti < 0 it follows that the product
Wti u(t, x i (t, (θ̂i , θ−i ), vti ))
is increasing in the reported type θ̂i . The derivative of the agents utility with respect to his initial
type (Equation (20)) simpliﬁes to
 T
 

−rt
i
i
i −i
i
E
e
Wt u(t, x (t, (θ̂ , θ ), vt )) dt
0

and thus, by the argument of Theorem 3, the virtual valuation maximizing allocation for the types
θ > θ̂ is incentive compatible.
The last two examples emphasize that our approach can accommodate not only private information about the initial state of a random process, but also private information about the structural
parameters of the stochastic process per se, such as the mean or the variance of the process. Importantly, and in contrast to much of the previous literature, we can also accommodate private
information about a state variable, such as the variance of the Brownian motion, that cannot be
ordered in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance.

7.2

Geometric Brownian Motion

The second class of private information processes that we analyze describe the willingness to pay
vti of agent i by a geometric Brownian motion, the class of process that we investigated earlier in
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some detail in Section 2. The geometric Brownian motion vti is completely described by its initial
value v0i , the drift μ and the variance σ of the diﬀusion process Wt . The willingness to pay of agent
i evolves according to:


dvti = vti μdt + σdWti ,

so that the valuation of agent i can be represented as


σ2
i
i
i
vt = v0 exp (μ − )t + σWt .
2

(32)

Note that the geometric Brownian motion is always positive which makes it particularly suitable
to describe a valuation process.
Unknown Initial Value First we analyze the case where the valuation process is a geometric
Brownian motion and the initial valuation is the private information, i.e. v0i = θi . Given the above
representation of the geometric Brownian motion, we have


σ2
i
i
i
i
i
vt = φ(t, θ , Wt ) = θ exp (μ − )t + σWt .
2

(33)

We verify that the partial derivative of φ with respect to the private information θi is given by
φθ =

φ
θ

and thus the expression of the virtual valuation is given by:


1 − F (θi )
i
i i
i
J (t, θ , vt ) = vt 1 −
.
f (θi )θi

It follows that the distortion imposed by the revenue maximizing mechanism is now linear in the
valuation at every point in time. The resulting revenue maximizing allocation simply multiplies
the valuation of every agent by a constant and then chooses the one with the highest product.
Importantly, each agent i is now either included or excluded from the market forever. If the second
term in the virtual utility, the (inverse) weighted hazard rate is negative, then agent i never receives
the object. Conversely, if the hazard rate term is positive, then agent i has a positive probability
of receiving the object at every time t. The associated ﬂow payments pit are similar to those of a
second prize auction:

pit

=

⎧
1−F (θ j )
⎪
j 1− f (θj )
⎪
⎨max 0, maxj=i vt 1−F (θi )
⎪
⎪
⎩0,

1−

f (θ i )

,

if i∗t = i;
if i∗t = i.
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Unknown Drift We now consider the case where the initial private information of the agent
constitutes the drift of the geometric Brownian motion. The valuation vti then evolves according to:


σ2
i
i
i
i
i
(34)
vt = φ(t, θ , Wt ) = v0 exp (θ − )t + σWt ,
2
and the derivative of φ with respect to θ which is given by φθ = φt. Thus the virtual valuation is
given by:


J(t, θ

i

, vti )

=

vti


1 − F (θi )
t .
1−
f (θi )

(35)

Interestingly, the distortion is still formed on the basis of a multiplicative handicap, but now the
handicap factor is increasing linearly in time. It follows that in contrast to the above case of an
unknown initial value, the distortion is now growing over time. As vt is positive, it follows that the
virtual valuation is positive before a deterministic time
T =

f (θi )
,
1 − F (θi )

and negative afterwards. Thus, the allocation of the object to agent i ends with probability one at
time T =

f (θ i )
.
1−F (θ i )

In every period, the object is allocated to the agent i∗t with the highest virtual utility, provided
that it is positive and the associated ﬂow payments pit are again similar to those of a second prize
auction:
pit

=

⎧
1−F (θ j )
⎪
j 1− f (θj ) t
⎪
⎨max 0, maxj=i vt 1−F (θi )
⎪
⎪
⎩0,

1−

f (θ i )

t

,

if i∗t = i;
if i∗t = i.

In a recent paper, Boleslavksy and Said (2013) derive the revenue maximizing contract in a
discrete time setting where the private information of a single agent is the uptick probability of a
multiplicative random walk. As it is well known, the geometric Brownian motion can be viewed as
the continuous time limit of the discrete time multiplicative random walk stochastic process. Thus,
it is naturally of interest to compare their results to the implications following our analysis. In
terms of the private information of the agent, the unknown drift in the geometric Brownian motion
here, represents the unknown uptick probability analyzed in Boleslavksy and Said (2013). As the
general convergence result of the stochastic process itself would suggest, we can also establish,
see the appendix for the details, that the continuous time limit of the virtual valuation derived
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in Boleslavksy and Said (2013) is the virtual valuation derived above by (35). However in the
continuous time limit the expression for the virtual valuation, see (35) above, becomes notably
easier to express and to interpret. The analysis in Boleslavksy and Said (2013) explicitly veriﬁes
the validity of the incentive constraints in the case of a single agent. With the general approach
taken here, we obtain the revenue optimal allocation in the presence of many agents.

7.3

Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process

Next we describe the implications for the revenue maximizing allocation if the stochastic process is
given by the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, which is the continuous-time analogue of the discrete-time
AR(1) process. The Ornstein Uhlenbeck process vti is completely described by its initial value v0i ,
the mean reversion level μ, the mean reversion speed m ≥ 0 and the variance σ ≥ 0 of the diﬀusion
process Bt . The willingness to pay of agent i evolves according to the stochastic diﬀerential equation:
dvti = m(μ − vt )dt + σdBti ,
where Bt is a standard Brownian motion. The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process can be represented using
a distinct Brownian motion B̃ as:
σe−mt
vt = v0 e−mt + μ(1 − e−mt ) + √
B̃2mt −1 .
2m

(36)

Hence we can deﬁne the process W as a time-changed Brownian Motion by
e−mt
Wtm = √ B̃2mt −1 .
2m
Using W we can represent the valuation of the agent as
vt = v0 e−mt + μ(1 − e−mt ) + σWtm .
Unknown Initial Value First we analyze the case where the valuation process is an Ornstein
Uhlenbeck process and the initial valuation is private information, i.e. v0i = θi . Given the representation (36) it follows that
∂vti
∂vti
−mt
=
e
and
= σ.
∂θi
∂Wti
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Thus, Assumption 1 and 2 are satisﬁed. The virtual valuation J equals
J(t, θi , vti ) = vti −

1 − F (θi ) −mt
e
.
f (θi )

Hence the optimal mechanism is a handicap mechanism with a deterministic handicap that is
exponentially decreasing over time. As the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process in the long run converges
to a stationary distribution which is independent of the starting value θi , Proposition 8 applies
and the distortion vanishes in the long run. Intuitively the initial valuation does not change the
expected valuation in the long run.
Unknown Long Run Average Similarly to the earlier analysis of the arithmetic or geometric
Brownian motion, we can also take the structural parameter of the stochastic process to be the
private information of the agent, that is we can take the expected long run average of the process
to be the private information of agent i, i.e. μ = θi . Given the representation (36) it follows that
∂vti
∂vti
−mt
=
1
−
e
and
= σ.
∂θi
∂Wti
Thus, Assumption 1 and 2 are satisﬁed. The virtual valuation J equals
J(t, θi , vti ) = vti −

1 − F (θi )
(1 − e−mt ) .
f (θi )

Hence the optimal mechanism is a handicap mechanism with a deterministic handicap that is
increasing over time. As the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process converges in the long run to a stationary
distribution which depends on the long run average θi the distortion increases in the long run.
Intuitively the expected valuation converges to the long run average θi , and so does the virtual
valuation, it converges to the long rune average as well.

7.4

A Bandit Model of Learning

Finally, we consider the allocations and distortions that arise in a multi-armed bandit model of
learning. Here, each agent is assumed to have an unknown valuation η i ∈ R+ for the object. While
the valuation is initially unknown to the agent he observes a signal zti about his valuation for the
object. The evolution of the signal z i given η i follows the stochastic diﬀerential equation:
dzti = η i dt + σdWti .
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Let us denote by F z,i the ﬁltration generated by the signal z i . As his true valuation is unknown to
the agent he uses his signal to calculate his expected valuation vt = E(η i | Ftz,i ). Let us denote by
F the distribution of v0 , i.e. v0 ∼ F . It is known, see Liptser and Shiryayev (1977), Theorem 10.1,
that the expected valuation v i of agent i follows the diﬀerential equation:
dvt =
where Wtz,i =

t
0

1
dWtz,i ,
1 + σ2t

dzs − vs ds is a Brownian motion with respect to F z . Thus the valuation vti at time

t equals:


vti

=

v0i

t

+
0

1
dWtz,i .
2
1+σ t

If the initial valuation v0i = θi is the private information of the agent at time zero, then it follows
that his virtual valuation is given by:
J(t, θi , vti ) = vti −

1 − F (θi )
.
f (θi )

Clearly, J is increasing in vti . If we assume further that
in θi . We then ﬁnd that as

1−F (θ i )
f (θ i )

1−F (θ i )
f (θ i )

is decreasing, then J is also increasing

is constant over time that the distortion in the allocation does

not vanish in the long-run.

8

Conclusion

We analyzed a class of dynamic allocation problems with private information in continuous time. In
contrast to much of the received literature in dynamic mechanism design, the private information
of each agent was not restricted to the current state of the Markov process. In particular, the
private information was allowed to pertain to structural parameters of the stochastic process such
as the drift of the arithmetic or geometric Brownian motion, or the long-run average of the meanreverting process. By allowing for a richer class of private information structures, we gained a
better understanding about the nature of the distortion due the private information. In contrast
to the Markovian settings, where the distortions induced by the revenue maximizing allocation are
typically vanishing over time, we have shown that the distortion can be constant, increasing or
decreasing over time. The analysis of the private information in terms of the stochastic ﬂow, the
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equivalent of the impulse response functions in continuous time, allowed us directly the nature of
the private information to the nature of the intertemporal distortion.
A distinct advantage of the continous time approach taken here is that we could oﬀer explicit
solutions, in terms of the optimal allocation, the level of distortion and the transfer payments.
We highlighted this advantage in the introductory example in which we gave complete, explicit
and surprisingly simple solutions to a class of sales/licensing problems. In particular, we showed
that we can implement the dynamic optimal contract by means of an essentially static contract, a
membership contract, that displayed such common empirical features as ﬂat rates, free consumption
units and two part tariﬀs.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 6. Note that a strong solution for the geometric Brownian motion is given by

 2
σ
vt = v0 exp − t + σWt + v.
2
By (17) the virtual valuation equals

J(t, v0 , vt ) = vt

1 − F (v0 )
1−
f (v0 )v0


+

1 − F (v0 )
v.
f (v0 )v0

(37)

As shown in Theorem 2 the seller aims at maximizing

 T
−rt
e (Jt xt − c(xt )) .
E


Deﬁne A(v0 ) = 1 −

1−F (v0 )
f (v0 )v0

−1

0

. At every point in time t the seller aims at choosing the consumption

level xt that maximizes the virtual valuation


 
1 − F (v0 )
1 − F (v0 )
+
J(t, v0 , vt )xt − c(x) = vt 1 −
v x − c(x)
f (v0 )v0
f (v0 )v0
= A(v0 )−1 (vt x − A(v0 )c(x) + (A(v0 ) − 1)xv)
Consequently a payment of pt = A(v0 )c(x) − (A(v0 ) − 1)xv perfectly aligns the interest of the buyer
and the seller at every point in time t > 0. It remains to prove that it is incentive compatible for
the buyer to report his time zero valuation truthfully.
Let us ﬁrst deal with the case where v = 0. Note that in this case Assumption 1 and 2 are
satisﬁed and thus Proposition 2 yields the monotonicity of the virtual valuation J(t, v0 , vt ) in v0
and vt conditional on Jt ≥ 0. If v is greater zero it follows from f (v) > 1/v and the monotonicity
of

1−F (v0 )
f (v0 )v0

that for all v0 ≥ v
1−

1 − F (v0 )
> 0.
f (v0 )v0

Hence, the virtual valuation deﬁned in (37) is increasing in vt and v0 . The proof of Theorem 3 show
that this is suﬃcient for for the existence of a payment that makes it incentive compatible to report
the time zero valuation truthfully.
Consider now the special case of quadratic costs, c(x) = x2 /2 and let the initial valuation v0 be
exponentially distributed with mean v̂:
P[v0 ≤ x] = 1 − exp (−v0 /v̂) .
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Consider the situation where the agent decided on a contract (m, A(m)) and the consumption tariﬀ
A(m) is ﬁxed. The optimal consumption of the agent at time t is given by


vt
x2
{xt } = arg max x vt − A(m)
=
.
x≥0
2
A(m)
Hence, the agents expected time zero utility from the contract is

 ∞

 ∞
−rt
−rt
max E
e (vt xt − m − A(m)c(xt )) = E
e
(xt )t∈R+

vt2
−m
2A(m)
0
m
v0
− .
=
2A(m)(r − σ)
r

0



(38)

Hence, if the agent will choose his optimal contract he will maximize (38) over m select a contract
(m, A(m)) only based on his time zero valuation v0 . Let us denote by m(v0 ) the ﬁxed fee chosen by
the agent of initial valuation v0 . In the optimal contract
⎧
⎪
⎨ v0
if v0 ≥ μ
v0 −μ
A(m(v0 )) =
⎪
⎩∞
else .
Hence all buyers who initially have a valuation below the average time zero valuation μ will be
excluded and never consume the good no matter how high their future valuation is.
Relationship to Boleslavksy and Said (2013)
We brieﬂy establish the relationship between the multiplicative random walk in the discrete time
environment of Boleslavksy and Said (2013) and the geometric Brownian motion analyzed here. Let
(Xk )k∈N be a multiplicative random walk, i.e.
⎧
⎪
⎨u Xk , with probability θ,
Xk+1 =
⎪
⎩d Xk , with probability 1 − θ ;
for some d < 1 < u and let the uptick probability θ ∈ (0, 1) be the private information. Boleslavksy
and Said (2013) show, see page 11, Eq. (7), that the virtual valuation in period k equals7
vki

1−

1{Xs =dXs−1 }
s≤k

7

u − d 1 − F (θ)
d(1 − θ) f (θ)

.

For convenience we translated their result into our notation. We use k for the period to clearly diﬀerentiate

between periods and physical time.
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In the next step we let the period length Δ go to zero. To do so let d ≡ dΔ , u ≡ uΔ and t ≡ Δk ∈ N.
The virtual valuation at the physical time t thus equals
⎞
⎛
 1 − F (θ)
 u
⎠.
1{Xs =dXs−1 } ( )Δ − 1
vti ⎝1 −
d
f
(θ)(1
−
θ)
t
s≤ Δ

Note that



t
s≤ Δ

1{Xs =dXs−1 } is Binomial distributed and converges to its expectation for Δ → 0,
⎤

⎡

i.e.
Δ→0

1{Xs =dXs−1 } ⎦ = (1 − θ)

1{Xs =dXs−1 } = E ⎣

lim

t
s≤ Δ

t
s≤ Δ

t
.
Δ


( ud )Δ − 1 = 1 we have that the virtual valuation goes to:


 1 − F (θ) 
 1 − F (θ) 
t  u Δ
1  u Δ
i
i
( ) −1
= vt 1 − t
( ) −1
vt 1 − (1 − θ)
Δ d
f (θ)(1 − θ)
Δ d
f (θ)


1 − F (θ)
t ,
= vti 1 −
f (θ)

As limΔ→0

1
Δ

which establishes the convergence to the virtual valuation derived earlier in (35).
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